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USES OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM THAT ATTENUATE
PATIENT SAFETY
Ross Koppel, Ph.D., FACMI*
INTRODUCTION
Electronic Health Records (EHR) vendors’ contracts with hospitals
and doctors exist within the framework of the U.S. legal system. This
constraint offers neither comfort nor safety—often enhancing vulner-
abilities to patients, clinicians, and healthcare organizations via the
EHR industry’s regulatory capture.1 First, by the appointment of pol-
icy leaders with conflicted commitments, and second, by the accept-
ance of clauses in EHR vendors’ contracts that are deemed unethical
by leading medical organizations but nevertheless remain in force.2
I. CONTEXT
Medical errors are the third largest killer of Americans, only ex-
ceeded by cancer and heart disease.3 EHRs were deemed the solution
to medical errors because of their abilities, including: to convey clear
medication orders to pharmacies; to display all lab reports and medi-
cal notes; to be accessible from anywhere in the hospital or, indeed,
anywhere in the country; and to easily share patient information
* Ross Koppel, Ph.D., FACMI (University of Pennsylvania and the University at Buffalo) is a
leading scholar of healthcare IT and of the interactions of people, computers, and workplaces.
His articles in all the major medical journals are considered seminal works. Professor Koppel
also directs several studies of cybersecurity. Both his research in medical informatics and cyber-
security employ his fifty-plus years of work in statistical analysis, evaluation methods, research
methods, surveys, ethnography, computer usability studies, data visualization interpretations, the
role of HIT in errors, and the sociology of work, organizations, and healthcare.
1. RAND CORP., AHRQ PUB. NO. 11-0105-EF, GUIDE TO REDUCING UNINTENDED CONSE-
QUENCES OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS (2011).
2. Ross Koppel, Forward to HIT OR MISS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATIONS (Jonathan Leviss et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013); Ross Koppel, Great
Promises of Healthcare Information Technology Deliver Less, in HEALTHCARE INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: CASES, STRATEGIES, AND SOLUTIONS 101–25 (Charlotte A. Weaver et
al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter Koppel, Great Promises of Healthcare Information Technology De-
liver Less]; Kenneth W. Goodman et al., Challenges in Ethics, Safety, Best Practices, and Over-
sight Regarding HIT Vendors, Their Customers, and Patients: A Report of an AMIA Special Task
Force, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 77, 77–78 (2010).
3. Martin A. Makary & Michael Daniel, Medical Error—The Third Leading Cause of Death
in the US, 353 BMJ i2139 (2016).
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amongst all healthcare providers, thus reducing redundant tests and
speeding time to diagnoses. With those promises and context, we be-
gin our discussion with the 1997 agreement between the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) and the EHR industry, including the
industry’s supporters.4 That agreement reflected the successful efforts
by the EHR industry to convince the FDA that EHRs were so safe
they need not be effectively regulated. There were two easily-met ex-
ceptions to this valuable accommodation: (1) EHR vendors should
adopt “a code of good business practices,” and (2) EHR vendors
should submit voluntary reports of harms if known.5 In effect, the
EHRs in the United States have had a regulatory-free zone since that
1997 agreement with the FDA and EHRs’ supporters and vendors. As
recently as 2009, the legislation that created incentives worth $27 bil-
lion for hospitals and doctors to buy EHRs still excluded safety and
quality standards for EHR systems in the release of the final rule for
the meaningful use of EHRs.6 Moreover, when Dr. Jeffrey Shuren—
head of the FDA’s medical devices division—called for mandatory re-
porting of adverse events, and required pre-marketing approval of
EHR devices, the Office of the National Coordinator for Health In-
formation Technology (ONC) dismissed Shuren’s findings as “anecdo-
tal and fragmentary.”7
A review of the supporting arguments and terms of that 1997 agree-
ment illustrates how advantageous it was and remains for EHR ven-
dors. The EHR vendors and supporters: (1) claimed that regulation
would impede innovation of this new industry; and (2) “charitably”
offered to relieve the FDA of the burden of regulating them because
4. Randolph R. Miller & Reed M. Gardner, Recommendations for Responsible Monitoring
and Regulation of Clinical Software Systems, 4 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 442, 442–45
(1997).
5. Id. at 447.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 300jj (Supp. V 2018); Fred Schulte & Emma Schwartz, FDA Asks Hospitals to
Report Safety Glitches in Digital Health Systems, HUFFINGTON POST (May 11, 2010, 5:12 AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/fda-asks-hospitals-to-rep_n_495691.html. “Meaningful
use” refers to the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs that provide financial incen-
tives to “eligible professionals” (e.g., physicians and hospitals that have bought and installed
EHRs). In the words of CMS, these users have to “demonstrate ‘meaningful use’ of certified
EHR technology through improved quality, safety, and efficiency of patient care.” The Medicare
and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs—Meaningful Use, AM. C. PHYSICIANS, https://www.acp
online.org/practice-resources/business-resources/health-information-technology/the-medicare-
and-medicaid-ehr-incentive-programs-meaningful-use (last visited Dec. 8, 2018). In reality,
“meaningful use” refers to the obligation to buy and use some EHR functions to gain subsidies
for the purchase of the software and to avoid penalties via CMS reimbursement deductions for
failure or refusal to use the EHRs.
7. FDA, ONC Clash Over Need for Regulation, Oversight of EHRs, MEDSPHERE, http://www
.medsphere.com/resources/news/health-it-news/3241-fda-onc-clash-over-need-for-regulation-
oversight-of-ehrs (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
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the FDA had such limited resources it should best focus on devices
that pose real risks to patient safety.8 EHRs, the vendors argued, were
too safe to bother to regulate.
The first argument about impeding infant industry is remarkable
because EHRs were already over thirty-five years old in 1997.9 Per-
haps more relevant, if you ask any physician to pick a word—even
now—to describe EHRs, “innovative” would almost certainly not be
among their choices. Additionally, the second argument—the idea
that EHRs are low risks for patient safety—is clearly absurd, perhaps
paradoxical.10 Last year, for example, the Emergency Care Research
Institute (ECRI Institute)11 listed EHRs and EHR guidance as the
most dangerous of all the patient safety hazards of their top ten
risks.12 EHRs were more hazardous than wrong patient errors,
opioids, mismanagement of anticoagulants and antibiotics, missing
critical test results, and failures to recognize when patients are dying.13
And, as detailed below, there are thousands of examples where EHRs
were associated with patient harm.
II. “HOLD HARMLESS” AND NON-DISCLOSURE CLAUSES
Putting aside (temporarily) the concern about regulatory capture,
we focus on two clauses in EHR contracts that powerfully and delete-
riously affect patient safety. They are the “hold harmless” and non-
disclosure clauses.14
The “hold harmless” clause in EHR contracts functions to prevent
vendors from being held responsible for errors in their software even
if the vendor has been repeatedly informed of the problem and even if
8. Miller & Gardner, supra note 4, at 447 (“We recommend that the FDA focus its regulatory
efforts on those systems posing highest clinical risk . . . .”).
9. As a thought experiment, what if commercial passenger jets in 1997 claimed that regulation
was premature because it would impede innovation?
10. See, e.g., Mary G. Amato et al., Computerized Prescriber Order Entry-Related Patient
Safety Reports: Analysis of 2522 Medication Errors, 24 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 316
(2017); Ross Koppel, The Health Information Technology Safety Framework: Building Great
Structures on Vast Voids, 0 BMJ QUALITY SAFETY 1 (2015); G. D. Schiff et al., Computerised
Physician Order Entry-Related Medication Errors: Analysis of Reported Errors and Vulnerability
Testing of Current Systems, 24 BMJ QUALITY SAFETY 264 (2015).
11. The ECRI Institute is a non-profit organization that evaluates patient safety risks.
12. Mike Miliard, Top 10 Patient Safety Concerns for 2017, According to ECRI, HEALTHCARE
IT NEWS (Mar. 14, 2017, 1:10 PM), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/top-10-patient-safety-
concerns-2017-according-ecri. EHR guidance is comprised of alerts that warn of allergies and
drug-drug interactions, among other things. EHR guidance is known as Computer Decision Sup-
port (CDS).
13. Id.
14. Ross Koppel & David Kreda, Health Care Information Technology Vendors’ “Hold Harm-
less” Clause: Implications for Patients and Clinicians, 301 JAMA 1276, 1276–78 (2009).
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the problem causes harm or death to patients. The clause relies on the
doctrine of a “learned intermediary,” that the doctor, pharmacist,
nurse or other clinician has unique, esoteric medical knowledge and
unique bedside knowledge which makes them entirely responsible for
the patient’s care.15 Vendors claim they simply supply a “tool” used by
medical professionals. Vendors are held harmless for any and all er-
rors, even if they are unambiguously at fault, and, as noted, even if
they’ve been repeatedly informed of the risks.16 When I testified at
Congressional and other hearings, every vendor’s spokesperson began
with, inter alia: “We create tools used by learned intermediaries—cli-
nicians, in the practice of their profession.”
Since the publication of the Koppel & Kreda article in the Journal
of the American Medical Association (JAMA), two Institute of
Medicine (IOM) reports and the American Medical Informatics Asso-
ciation (AMIA) task force on vendor relations have urged the re-
moval of the hold harmless clause, calling it “unethical” and counter
to the improvement of patient safety.17
A. Has That Clause Been Removed? Unlikely
There is some confusion about the persistence of that clause. Sev-
eral vendors claimed that they did not intentionally insert them in
their contracts; that they just sort of appeared—a form of spontaneous
emergence or a vestigial from previous sales agreements. That said,
few vendors deny their existence, although they claim that the clause
is less onerous than it looks because of the possibility that it might be
challenged in court. Some vendors also claim they have removed
them. However, to date, no vendor to my knowledge has certified that
their contracts are free of that clause. Moreover, vendors refuse to
provide their contracts for public review on the grounds that the con-
tracts are protected intellectual property (IP). Of note here, neither
the ONC or the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS)—theoret-
ically the regulators of EHRs—have ever demanded its removal.18
III. NON-DISCLOSURE
The second clause discussed in the Koppel & Kreda piece is the
non-disclosure clause. It is a more direct threat to patient safety be-
cause it prohibits doctors from openly making pejorative statements
15. Id. at 1278.
16. Id.
17. Koppel, Great Promises of Healthcare Information Technology Deliver Less, supra note 2,
at 111.
18. Id.
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about the EHR software; and far worse, it prevents them from posting
screenshots of EHR interfaces that they find dangerous to patients.
Thus, for example, a clinician cannot post a screenshot of a vendor’s
software that she finds misleading, disorganized, confusing, or down-
right lethal. A physician can complain about it in the vendor’s elec-
tronic forum (which is controlled by the vendor), she can show it to
the colleague at her shoulder, but she cannot make a pejorative com-
ment at a public meeting, on a public listserv, or at a public forum.
Most critical, she cannot post a dangerous screenshot to fellow clini-
cians or to the general medical community even if she accompanied
that image with evidence of harm, with an explanation of why it is a
danger to patient safety, and with a discussion of the role of, say, her
hospital’s IT department in exacerbating or facilitating the problem.
The results of this non-disclosure clause are that other clinicians and
medical informaticists are prevented from learning of the problem or
problems, they may harm more patients, and they are thwarted in ef-
forts to improve safety or improve clinical efficiencies. I argue that
patient safety is directly imperiled by this non-disclosure clause.
As to the existence of non-disclosure clauses in vendor contracts
and the efficacy of their power: Everything noted above about hold
harmless clauses applies exactly the same as the non-disclosure
clauses. These clauses can be hidden in a sea of contract pages and
they can be argued about, but we cannot get a public presentation or
an assertion of their total removal.
IV. LONG AND COMPLEX VENDOR CONTRACTS
Part of the difficulty of determining the prevalence and power of
those clauses is the complexity of the vendor contracts. I have a copy
of the EpicCare Inpatient Clinical Systems (Epic)19 contract with the
Dallas hospital that misdiagnosed and failed to correctly treat Thomas
Eric Duncan, the first American to die of Ebola. The hospital’s EHR
vendor contract is over 3,000 pages long. It was only obtained via the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) because the hospital received
public funding. It has hundreds of subparts and linked references. I
have been told only a healthcare attorney familiar with health infor-
mation technology (HIT) contracts could discern the many interre-
lated parts. I have also been told that because of the “joint and several
19. Epic is the name of a large EHR company. EpicCare is one of the many local brand names
hospitals adopt to refer to their Epic EHRs.
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clause,” it is hard to easily identify the hold harmless or non-disclo-
sure provisions.20
V. WHY SCREENSHOTS ARE NEEDED
This following example illustrates the implications of the screenshot
prohibition. It involves Dr. Robert Wachter’s best-selling 2015 book:
The Digital Doctor: Hope, Hype, and Harm at the Dawn of Medicine’s
Computer Age.21 The first chapter of that book—which parallels our
topic here—is about a young doctor who entered an order for a child
needing an antibiotic. Almost all children’s dosages are created in
weight-based dosages, e.g., so many milligrams per kilograms of the
child’s weight. However, when the patient grows to be about 110
pounds (50 kilograms) the dosage usually shifts from weight-based to
those of an adult, which are specified as the number of pills for each
time of administration, e.g., one pill three times a day.
Unfortunately, this young patient was just at that point where the
dosage ceased to be weight-based, but rather shifted to a standard
adult dosage. There was a very subtle shift in the EHR ordering
screen that imperceptibly switched from weight-based dosage to sim-
ply the number of pills to be administered. The two screens were al-
most identical. Tragically, because of the almost imperceptible screen
change, the doctor meant to order the appropriate weight-based dos-
age, but instead accidentally ordered a full adult dosage multiplied by
the child’s weight. This accidental order equaled about thirty-eight
adult-size pills—a dose that could have been lethal was given to the
child. There’s a long explanation of how the several alarms and efforts
to intervene failed to stop the massive overdose, but the result was
awful, with the child suffering grand mal seizures and requiring weeks
in the ICU. Fortunately, the young boy survived.
I present this example because even the world-famous Dr. Robert
Wachter struggled for many months with the vendor to be allowed to
show the screenshot of the EHR ordering screen change that led to
the event. This is the non-disclosure agreement in practice. Moreover,
it illustrates how screenshots can enable others to learn from
problems and then repair dangers. One can imagine how long it would
take the average MD or IT staffer to get permission to display rele-
20. Koppel, Great Promises of Healthcare Information Technology Deliver Less, supra note 2,
at 111.
21. ROBERT M. WACHTER, THE DIGITAL DOCTOR: HOPE, HYPE, AND HARM AT THE DAWN
OF MEDICINE’S COMPUTER AGE (2015). Professor Wachter is one of the most famous doctors in
the world; he is the founder of the “hospitalist” doctor movement, and he recently wrote the
evaluation and plan for the English National Health Service’s system and technology use.
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vant screens and inform the profession and the patient safety commu-
nity. She would probably never receive permission.
VI. SCREENSHOTS AND THE FDA STUDY OF EHRS
This next Section, which discusses the nation-wide implications of
non-disclosure clauses, provides a more comprehensive perspective
that includes most major EHR vendors and several leading healthcare
systems. Two years ago, I co-authored an analysis of EHR medication
ordering screens. The study was commissioned by the FDA22 and co-
ordinated at Brigham and Women’s Hospital at Harvard Medical
School (BWH) and Harvard Vanguard Medical Associates. It re-
flected the participation of the hospital systems from the University of
Pennsylvania (where I was the site leader and co-Principal Investiga-
tor), Montefiore Medical System in New York City, Kaiser
Permanente Northwest, and the University of Illinois at Chicago.23
The FDA wanted this study of EHR medication ordering screens to
examine if drug name truncations might facilitate or generate medica-
tion errors. For example, if drug names were artificially truncated, the
clinician might not be able to see if the dose was a different formula-
tion, or in fact a very different medication with a longer name. We
convinced the FDA to allow us to also examine the entire ordering
screen to explore dangers caused by pop-ups (warning screens) that
obscure the patient’s full medication list (which could cause double-
dosing) or hide the problem list (which is used for understanding the
reasons for medications). Inconsistent listings might also defeat alerts
for overdosing, under-dosing, double-dosing, or drug-drug interac-
tions. To resolve this concern, we studied many EHRs screens and
found over 50 examples that could lead to errors, some of which were
serious. For one instance, we found an EHR that listed the medication
“Coumadin” (brand name) and also listed the exact same drug as
“warfarin” (generic). Critically here, if a patient were prescribed both
of these identical drugs the EHRs alert system could not catch it and
would not give a double-dose warning, thus endangering the patient
with an anticoagulant overdose leading to hemorrhage and perhaps
death.
We asked several local physicians in each of the five participating
hospital systems with a different EHR to order a predetermined list of
medications and to conduct a series of actions (e.g., change a dose
22. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., UCM477419, COMPUTERIZED PRESCRIBER ORDER ENTRY
MEDICATION SAFETY: UNCOVERING AND LEARNING FROM ISSUES AND ERRORS, https://www.fda
.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/MedicationErrors/UCM477419.pdf.
23. Id.
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from 4 milligrams to 5 milligrams). We then observed each screen as
the process occurred. Obviously, to document the screens used for or-
dering medications we had to have images of the screens. At first, the
vendors refused to allow us to record the screens on their usual
grounds that screenshots are not permitted because of the non-disclo-
sure clauses in their contracts. They additionally claimed that the
screens are protected intellectual property (IP). We countered, first
with the question: “Why do you want to protect the IP of screens that
lead to patient harm?” That brought no response. Second, we empha-
sized that by refusing us, the vendors were refusing the FDA. That
argument had a salutatory influence, and after much discussion, we
received permission to tape the sessions with the caveat that only the
FDA would see the resulting screenshots. While disappointed that
others would not learn from the graphic examples, we accepted the
limitation and conducted the research.
The results were remarkable and remarkably distressing. We identi-
fied and took screenshots of over fifty different dangers, including:
• inability to see what medications the user or other clinicians
have ordered;
• inability to see the patient’s other medications (thus leading to
possible double-dosing or drug-drug interaction errors);
• items in drop-down lists not visible on the screen;
• ambiguity or inability to see the form of the drug (e.g., liquid,
pill, patch, or suppository);
• drug names with added confusing text;
• inconsistent suffixes and modifiers (e.g., child dose, extended re-
lease, or “only for use on patients with renal monitoring”);
• failure to transmit medication discontinuation orders;
• inability to put orders “on hold” (which is usually placed before
a surgery and many examinations); and
• use of inconsistent taxonomies and dosage systems.
After a year or two of additional discussions with the vendors, all
but one vendor allowed us to share the screenshots publicly. However,
that one vendor—with more than a lion’s share of the market—pre-
vented us from displaying the screenshots, some of which are clearly
dangerous or deadly. We worked around this limitation by substitut-
ing the one vendor’s screens with parallel screens taken from
Harvard’s homegrown, but by then superannuated, EHR. These
images and screenshots illustrated over fifty EHR risks caused by dan-
gerous and confusing EHR interfaces. The resulting publication, now
available from the FDA as a free PDF, is titled “Computerized Pre-
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scriber Order Entry Medication Safety: Uncovering and Learning
from Issues.”24
But wouldn’t that document have been more helpful if we were able
to present the findings when first available, rather than haggle for a
year or two? Wouldn’t it be more helpful if the document included all
of the full images from each system we studied?
VII. THE PROBLEM WITH REPORTING PROBLEM
Another consequence of non-disclosure and lack of sharing infor-
mation, in the already complicated process of EHR implementation
and optimization, is that clinicians are often uncertain why things
don’t work and who is at fault.25 Their uncertainty is understandable
because EHRs are affected by a number of factors: tens of thousands
of moving parts; constant updates and modifications by the provider’s
local IT department and by the vendor; frequent changes to the medi-
cation formulations (e.g., the pharmaceutical company changes the 40
milligram pill to a 35 milligram sustained release capsule); the inven-
tory decisions of internal pharmacies, called “formularies;” the actions
of outside pharmacies; and computer decision support algorithms
which often differ from ward to ward and from facility to facility.26 In
addition, because the EHR digitally interacts with hundreds of other
IT systems—e.g., inventory, local pharmacy IT, thousands of smart
pumps and monitors, outside labs, inside labs, medical devices, and
outside pharmacies—the user often does not know the reason she is
encountering a problem.27 The user always wonders: Is it me? Is it a
recent update? Is it a missed memo? Is it a recent training session I
forgot to attend? Is it a new drug formulation? Is it a new treatment
protocol? Is it new order-sets? Thus, users’ uncertainties often result
in few problems being reported because of their unknown causes, fear
of looking foolish, and, of course, lack of time when they are trying to
order medications for patients.28 Bad user interfaces therefore con-
tinue unreported and unaddressed. The implications to patient safety
and clinician frustration are obvious.29
24. Id.
25. See Christine A. Sinsky et al., Comparative User Experiences of Health IT Products: How
User Experiences Would Be Reported and Used, INST. MED. NAT’L ACADS. 8 (Sept. 2012), https:/
/nam.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/comparative-user-experiences.pdf.
26. See id. See generally ROSS KOPPEL & SUZANNE GORDON, FIRST, DO LESS HARM: CON-
FRONTING THE INCONVENIENT PROBLEMS OF PATIENT SAFETY (2012).
27. Sinsky et al., supra note 25, at 8. See generally KOPPEL & GORDON, supra note 26.
28. Sinsky et al., supra note 25, at 8.
29. Id. See generally KOPPEL & GORDON, supra note 26.
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VIII. LACK OF DATA STANDARDS AND LIMITED
INTEROPERABILITY
Without unified data standards and data formats, achieving inter-
operability across systems—and indeed sometimes across the hall-
way—is impossible. Proprietary interests, legacy systems, and
previous capital investments make agreement on standards difficult.
But without unified data standards and data formats, we create Tow-
ers of Babel within each medical facility and across the nation. Worse,
we severely attenuate the utility of HIT, which was based on the es-
sential idea that patients’ data were available anywhere for both rou-
tine care and emergencies. Without unified data standards we cannot
share information across systems, and we fail to achieve real inter-
operability. These Towers of Babel become isolated from each
other—a noisy but deaf city.
A. Missing Data Standards and the Loss to Medical Progress
In addition to the loss of information for individual patients, data
standards would enable far greater patient safety and medical knowl-
edge advancement. This would allow research to move medical sci-
ence ahead by decades via access to the oceans of available data to be
combined and analyzed. Yet, despite enthusiastic agreement on their
need and value, EHR data standards are still not set. I suggest six
reasons:
1. Speed Available Products to Market
Legislators and regulators did not insist on data standards in part
because of the government’s expectation that EHRs would bring mas-
sive improvements in safety and money savings just by use of the tech-
nology itself.30 With this belief, regulators allowed the EHR vendors
to sell whatever systems were then available with whatever separate
data standards existed in their systems. This benefitted the vendors by
not delaying their products’ passage to the market and also by encour-
aging market share capture with their existing or nascent products—a
powerful lock because of the vast costs and lengthy implementation
process. In the words of many physicians, “the industry rushed their
not-ready-for-prime-time software to market.”
30. See Koppel, Great Promises of Healthcare Information Technology Deliver Less, supra
note 2, at 106.
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2. Network Effects and Lumpy Capital Investments
Vendors also benefit from sales of integrated collections of proprie-
tary systems that communicate primarily with their own brands. This
requires the purchase of the vendor’s entire suite of products and dis-
courages the purchase of “best of breed” systems or of maintaining
some legacy systems. Probably more important here, however, is that
large HIT systems are so costly and take so many years to implement,
there is little room for buyer’s remorse. Once an organization buys an
EHR, it is generally wed to that system for many years. Organizations
do not easily junk a system that costs five hundred million dollars in
direct cost and four or five times that figure in personnel costs and
other costs for implementation, linkages, retrofitting, and training.
The vendors thus sought to capture market share as soon as possible.
They were incentivized to rush their HIT products to market before
the products were sufficiently tested and before the vendors could be
pressured to harmonize or set data standards.
3. Government Subsidies and Penalties for Laggards
In 2009, the government obliged doctors and hospitals to install the
systems with a combination of carrots and sticks.31 The carrots were
government subsidies paid to hospitals and to doctors to buy the sys-
tems. Hospitals and physicians received millions to help purchase the
systems. The sticks were in the form of penalties to hospitals and doc-
tor’s offices that failed to quickly buy and use the EHRs. Healthcare
providers suffered crippling penalties in Medicare and Medicaid reim-
bursements if they remained wallflowers at the HIT digital dance
party, i.e., if they didn’t buy the EHRs and use them for a prescribed
set of minimal functions.
4. Ideology, Orthodoxy, and Public Relations
The HIT industry, its true believers, and government agencies ac-
tively promoted EHRs with a constant public relations effort to con-
vince clinicians and patients that EHRs were safer—by definition. The
ideology was constantly reinforced: more HIT = safer care. To help
the campaign, government funders refused research grants to many of
those who wished to conduct studies that might cast doubts about the
claims of the technology’s extravagant successes. HIT agnostics were
seen as retrograde and dangerous to patient safety. Those with any
reluctance to overlook EHR-caused problems, inefficiencies, and
medical errors were seen as technophobes, incompetents, and non-
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 300jj (Supp. V 2018).
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team players. This form of us-versus-them ideology ultimately deterio-
rated the very technology it was intended to protect by ignoring or
explaining away weaknesses, and by always assuming the next version
or patch will solve all problems.
5. Publication Amenability
The HIT bandwagon was facilitated by medical and informatics
journals’ usual publication bias favoring positive findings (e.g., EHRs
save lives and money), and by editors and reviewers who became
champions of the technology as necessary to save medicine from its
problems. Major journals published papers showing EHRs could elim-
inate errors by up to 86% compared to paper systems—even though
many of the errors “eliminated” were inherent in the digital process
itself and had no relevance to actual patient safety.32 For example,
with EHRs, all medication orders are automatically electronically
signed, whereas with paper a physician might not sign an order that
she dictated to the ward secretary. Or with EHRs, one must specify
the route of the medication, whereas with paper it is possible to put in
an order for a suppository or skin patch without specifically saying
how it was to be administered to the patient. As the leading patient
safety and HIT scholar David W. Bates noted as long ago as 1998,
many of the errors “eliminated” by EHRs were inconsequential,
would never have reached the patient, or both.33 Nevertheless, U.S.
professional publications overwhelmingly highlighted the strings of
success and seldom devoted ink to the problems.
6. Career Implications
The vast funds involved, and the consequential career implications
of those participating in HIT purchases also encouraged intimidation
of critics and those who reported problems with the technology. That
is, a Chief Information Officer (CIO) or Chief Medical Information
Officer (CMIO) who advocated spending millions or billions on im-
32. See generally Joan S. Ash, et al., Computerized Physician Order Entry in U.S. Hospitals:
Results of a 2002 Survey, 11 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 95 (2004); Joan S. Ash, et al., Some
Unintended Consequences of Information Technology in Health Care: The Nature of Patient Care
Information System-Related Errors, 11 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 104 (2004); David W.
Bates et al., Effect of Computerized Physician Order Entry and a Team Intervention on Preven-
tion of Serious Medication Errors, 280 JAMA 1311 (1998) [hereinafter Bates et al., Effect of
Computerized Physician Order Entry and a Team Intervention on Prevention of Serious Medica-
tion Errors]; David W. Bates, et al., Effects of Computerized Physician Order Entry and Clinical
Decision Support Systems on Medication Safety: A Systematic Review, 163 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1409 (2003).
33. Bates et al., Effect of Computerized Physician Order Entry and a Team Intervention on
Prevention of Serious Medication Errors, supra note 32, at 1314.
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plementing an EHR is less likely to describe that purchase and instal-
lation as a failure. Those raising doubts or demanding independent
evaluations or return on investment (ROI) analyses are not appreci-
ated. One is reminded of the Sicilian proverb that “one does not ex-
amine the bride as carefully if the dowry is very large.” On the other
hand, history does not suggest that products are improved by ignoring
their faults.
B. Lack of Standards and Interoperability Produce a Workaround
Because all agreed that industry-wide data standards and interoper-
ability could and should be a key benefit of EHRs—and indeed, a
major underlying function—there was increasing pressure to find a so-
lution to the lack of interoperability. Absent regulations or self-regu-
lation by the industry, the proposed solution now focuses on a
workaround called “application programming interfaces” (APIs).34
APIs are intended to create the digital equivalent of a “Rosetta stone”
for different systems with different data standards. It is hoped EHRs
will be able to communicate across systems via the API as a crosswalk
or translation service that will make the information intelligible to dif-
ferent systems using differing data standards.35 However, as John
D’Amore et al. have demonstrated, APIs and related workarounds
can fail to accurately convey the needed information across systems.36
There are just so many variations on how the information is entered
and stored in EHRs that overcoming the resulting cacophony with
digital workarounds is not always assured. APIs are improving and
work much of the time, but given the life-critical needs for correct
patient data, a workaround remains a second-best solution.
IX. USABILITY
The last issue we discuss is how usability is affected by regulatory
capture and by the non-disclosure and hold harmless clauses. Usabil-
ity is defined as the design and functionality of the software that al-
lows users to accomplish their goals without undue struggles. A well-
designed EHR (or any software interface) is understandable, predict-
34. Alexa T. McCray et al., Health IT Vendors and the Academic Community: The 2014 ACMI
Debate, 60 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 365, 366 (2016). An application program interface
(API) is a piece of software that contains routines, protocols, and tools that specifies how other
software components should interact.
35. Id. at 366.
36. John D. D’Amore et al., Are Meaningful Use Stage 2 Certified EHRs Ready for Interoper-
ability? Findings from the SMART C-CDA Collaborative, 21 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N
1060, 1066 (2014); see also McCray et al., supra note 34, at 366.
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able, and learnable. Additionally, EHR should allow users to under-
stand where they are in the program (navigation) and provide useful
visualizations and data displays. A usable EHR interface is less likely
to generate errors than a user-hostile one and does not cause unneces-
sary frustration. However, many clinicians’ usability problems are far
less likely to be addressed without transparency, screenshots, and
ongoing reporting of usability issues. Those views can be fairly charac-
terized as user-hostile, time-consuming, frustrating, and error-prone.37
Common examples of EHR usability problems include:
• the need to click 27 times and scroll for 45 seconds to find two
items that should be contiguous (the clickarrhea epidemic);38
• scales that are chronological on part of the screen and reverse
chronological on another;
• logos that have different meanings, sometimes on the same
screen;
• medical test names that differ from screen to screen;
• inability to find needed information where it should be;
• drop-down lists that continue to the next screen but don’t warn
the user;
• fonts that are illegible to adults of any age;
• color combinations that obscure findings; and
• failure to clearly differentiate critical findings, whether positive
or out-of-range, from routine results.
Limitations imposed by the non-disclosure clause severely attenuate
effective reporting of clunky, inconvenient, and even dangerous
EHRs. Without free and ongoing feedback, the profession and IT
leaders are less likely to be told of problems and are far less likely to
receive actionable information about these problems. Underlying
these problems are the motivations, beliefs, and administrative struc-
tures of the Office of the National Coordinator of Healthcare IT
(ONC), which, as we shall see, may serve as an excellent example of
regulatory capture. From its creation, the ONC did not focus on us-
ability,39 but rather, sought to downplay it by mirroring the vendors’
views that usability was “subjective,” “too theoretic for practical ap-
plication,” “too dependent on the implementation process,” “too de-
pendent on individual user skill,” “unscientific,” and “unmeasurable.”
37. See Robert Wachter & Jeff Goldsmith, To Combat Physician Burnout and Improve Care,
Fix the Electronic Health Record, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 30, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/to-
combat-physician-burnout-and-improve-care-fix-the-electronic-health-record.
38. Sinsky et al., supra note 25, at 6–7.
39. Letter from the Adoption Certification Workgroup, Health IT Policy Comm., to David
Blumenthal, Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech. (Apr. 22, 2010), https://www.healthit.gov/
sites/default/files/facas/adoptioncertificationletterhitsafetyfinal508.pdf.
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In fact, the role of EHR usability evaluation was not taken up by the
ONC until recently. In the enabling legislation, the Health Informa-
tion Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) of
2009,40 usability was to be overseen by the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST).41 However, rather than encourage
NIST to actively evaluate usability, the ONC sought successfully to
weaken NIST’s role, and then tried—unsuccessfully—to deny any
NIST function whatsoever regarding EHRs’ usability analysis. In fact,
the agreement with NIST succeeded in burying all of the usability
evaluation research by demanding that:
1. Submission of EHRs by vendors to NIST for usability evalua-
tions would not be required—it was entirely voluntary.
2. A vendor need not inform anyone that its product was or was
not submitted.
3. The results of the findings could not be shown to anyone other
than the submitting vendor.
4. The vendor need never inform anyone of the findings or of the
existence of the findings.
5. No real comparisons could ever be shown or published.42
When the ONC later gave funding to Dr. Jiajie Zhang at the Univer-
sity of Texas at Houston to test EHR usability, the ONC insisted upon
the same rules of non-transparency that it obliged NIST to follow.43
Of course, the ONC never discouraged improving EHRs’ usability,
and more recently has taken up usability’s cause. However, for most
of its existence, the ONC saw as its first mission to encourage and
reward providers to purchase EHRs. To the extent that usability re-
quirements might impede that mission, the ONC did not wish to im-
pose usability metrics. Moreover, one of the leading members of the
committee to create HITECH, who is also a key EHR vendor chair,
40. 42 U.S.C. § 300jj (Supp. V 2018).
41. Margaret Rouse, HITECH (Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health) Act of 2009, TECHTARGET, https://searchhealthit.techtarget.com/definition/HITECH-
Act (last updated Jan. 2018); HITECH Act Enforcement Interim Final Rule, HHS.GOV, https://
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/hitech-act-enforcement-interim-final-rule/in
dex.html (last updated June 16, 2017).
42. Interview with Dr. Svetlana Z. Lowry, Info. Access Div. Head, Nat’l Inst. Standards &
Tech., Info. Tech. Lab.
43. Letter from the Adoption Certification Workgroup, supra note 39, at 2. For more informa-
tion regarding the ONC’s transparency policies, see Elise Sweeney Anthony & Steven Posnack,
Transparency Requirements for Health IT Developers Will Help Providers Know More About
Their Products, HEALTH IT BUZZ BLOG (June 1, 2016), https://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/
healthit-certification/transparency-requirements-health-developers-will-help-providers-know-
products.
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famously stated that “usability testing will be included over my dead
body.”44
In the words of Dr. Shawn Martin, Senior Vice President of Advo-
cacy, Practice Advancement, and Policy of the American Association
of Family Practitioners, “I struggle to find an articulate and elegant
way to describe what is so frustrating about electronic health records,
but I think I have found a way to do so succinctly — they suck. They
suck as products, and they suck the life out of everyone that uses
them.”45
CONCLUSION
The horror of medical error is so great, the cost of U.S. healthcare
so outsized and troubling, the desire for technological solutions so
pervasive, the societal impact of digital technologies so impressive,
and the claims of EHRs so comforting that healthcare institutions
sought solutions in computerization of medical records. EHRs, in fact,
offer amazing and myriad advantages. They remove handwriting er-
rors, speed orders instantly to the pharmacy, can be accessed any-
where, and provide digital audits. Additionally, they always oblige
clinicians to specify exact medication routes, schedules, dosages,
times, etc. They also offer order sets—collections of medications that
are often used as a group. Last, via CDS, they warn of overdoses,
drug-drug interactions, and drug allergies.
It is understandable, therefore, that so many in healthcare, govern-
ment, and academia sought to deploy EHRs as quickly and as widely
as possible. EHR vendors, not surprisingly, joined with EHR enthusi-
asts to reduce or eliminate regulation that might impede sales and im-
plementation of the technology. The result was a successful effort to
convince the FDA that regulation would be a hindrance to innovation
and a barrier to speedy acceptance and sales. This was the setting for
regulatory capture, creating what is essentially a regulatory-free zone
where data standards, interoperability, and usability—the critical ele-
ments missing from EHRs—were allowed to go unaddressed. This
was also the context that created compliant policy groups and
regulators.
Two of the mechanisms employed by EHR vendors were the non-
disclosure and hold harmless clauses. Collectively, these clauses limit
clinicians’ and IT staffs’ access to information that would assist in
44. Shawn Martin, EHR Market Needs Competition, Innovation, IN THE TRENCHES BLOG
(May 1, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.aafp.org/news/blogs/inthetrenches/entry/20180501ITT_ehrs
.html.
45. Id.
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avoiding harm to patients and would improve clinical efficiencies. The
hold harmless clause is a “get out of jail free” card that acts as a disin-
centive for vendors to quickly address problems. It is telling that those
clauses have not been prohibited or removed by regulators or legisla-
tors despite their known roles as barriers to patient safety and clinical
efficiency.
While it is unquestionable that EHRs have improved significantly
since the 1997 agreement between the FDA and the EHR industry,
the FDA’s acceptance of the argument that EHRs were sufficiently
risk-free so as to not require regulation remains dubious and unsub-
stantiated by research. Consequently, patient safety was and is com-
promised; clinicians were and are frustrated,46 interoperability is still
nascent, usability is primitive compared to other modern digital sys-
tems, and the innovation supposedly sought by EHR vendors in the
absence of regulation remains subpar.
What is needed is a system that allows frictionless reporting of EHR
hazards and inefficiencies as they are encountered by clinicians and
others. These reports should be immediately available to the profes-
sion. Those hazards to patient safety should be expeditiously cor-
rected. Vendors, of course, should be given the opportunity to counter
complaints (e.g., demonstrate that the problem was entirely due to a
poor implementation or user misunderstanding), but ultimately,
healthcare professionals should have the final say.
EHRs offer extraordinary advantages over paper, but they will not
realize their promise if contractual clauses and compliant regulators
allow problems to be obscured and needed repairs to be ignored.
46. Id.; Wachter & Goldsmith, supra note 37.
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